Introduction.
A large literature has used Granger (1969) causality, GC, tests to examine the interaction of military spending with the economy. The null hypothesis in these tests is Granger non-causality, GNC: that one variable does not help predict another. For instance, Dunne and Smith (1990) , in the first issue of this journal, could not reject the hypothesis of GNC in both directions between the share of military expenditure and unemployment in a sample of OECD countries. Tang et al. (2009) also test for GNC using global panel data and find no evidence for GC from unemployment to military expenditure, but some evidence for GC from military expenditure to unemployment for non-OECD countries. There are also many studies testing GNC between military expenditure and other economic variables, particularly output; early examples being Joerding (1986) , Kinsella (1990) , Chowdhury (1991) , Chen (1993) with more recent examples being Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003) and Kollias et al. (2004 Kollias et al. ( , 2007 , who also take account of the possibility of cointegration.
GNC tests are a useful statistical technique to answer a specific though quite limited question: does one variable help predict another? Although the limitations of GNC tests are known, they are often not emphasised in the applied literature and so may be forgotten. Therefore it seems useful to survey the application of the technique and its limitations, using data from the US and other countries for illustration. We emphasise the short-run time series issues, the longer-run cross section issues in the military expenditure growth relationship are discussed in Dunne et al. (2005) and some of the wider econometric issues in Dunne and Smith (2007) .
The attraction of the GC approach is that it treats all the variables, military and economic, as endogenous; allows effects in any direction; and uses an 'atheoretical' reduced form, vector autoregression, VAR, framework. This has the advantage over a structural model in that it does not require identification. The identification problem is apparent in the contrast between the literature on the economic effects of military expenditure, which treats military expenditure as exogenous and GDP as endogenous, and the literature on the demand for military expenditure which treats military expenditure as endogenous and GDP as exogenous. To identify both relationships requires having some exogenous strategic or political variables (such as measures of threat) that shift military expenditure but not GDP and some economic variables that shift GDP but not military expenditure. It may be difficult to find such variables.
However, the advantages of the reduced form approach come at some costs, including the difficulty of interpreting the results; the sensitivity of the tests to the specification of the VAR and the fact that since the estimates on which the tests are based are not structural, they may not be stable 2 .
Section 2 discusses the wider theoretical issues in the interactions between the economy and military expenditure. The subsequent sections discuss a series of issues in the use of the concept of Granger causality: definition and testing, integration and cointegration, measuring the size and direction of the effect, instantaneous causality and the number of variables to include in the VAR. These issues are illustrated with data, primarily from the US, but in section 9 other countries.
Interactions between military expenditure and the economy
The standard economic account of how a nation determines military expenditure emphasises perceptions of: the threats to its security; its ability to pay, usually 
.
Some argued that military expenditure was the source of the extra effective demand that stopped capitalism sinking into depression; since the US and UK devoted a much higher share of output to the military than their previous peacetime norms.
The most influential exposition of this view was Baran and Sweezy (1966) . This argument, sometimes labelled military Keynesianism, was developed by various other authors, particularly with reference to the US. They suggested that military expenditure was used to offset the tendency to stagnation and unemployment and adjusted to stabilise the economy and thus was a blessing for capitalism, rather than a burden. Cypher (2007) suggests that there has been a shift from military
Keynesianism to "global-neoliberal militarism", in which the economic benefit of military expenditure comes through rather different channels.
There one period ahead, but may help predict t h y + several periods ahead, because it works through indirect effects. We ignore this issue which is discussed by Dufour and Renault (1998) .
GC measures incremental predictability, relative to an information set, not causality in the usual sense: weather forecasts are GC for the weather, but few regard them as causing the weather. The use of the abbreviation GC for Granger Cause is to emphasise that this is not causation in the usual sense. The fallacy of inferring causation from temporal sequence is known as post hoc, ergo propter hoc, 'after it therefore because of it', which is the title of a famous article, Tobin (1970) , criticising the use of timing to establish causality. This timing problem is particularly severe in economics because of the role of expectations and intentionality. For instance, the permanent income theory, which says consumption is determined by expected future income, implies that changes in consumption are not predicted by past income, while consumption does predict income. So according to the theory consumption is GC for income, while income is GNC for consumption, the reverse of the economic causality.
3 Granger (1969, p428) 
Where is an vector of endogenous variables; is a vector of deterministic elements; a vector of errors with expected value zero and covariance matrix ; and 
The elements of the variance covariance matrix Σ are:
And the null hypotheses are:
(a) that is GNC for Since GC is defined relative to a particular information set, the result of the test is conditional on the specification of the model (e.g. it assumes a particular set of variables in the VAR and that the data are generated by a VAR of finite order rather than say a VARMA model). We have assumed the model is linear, Karagianni and Pempetzoglu (2009) Adding extra lags reduces the probability of misspecification and thus bias; but also increases the standard errors, reducing the power of the test. The power is the probability that one will reject the null (GNC) when it is false, so low power means that one is less likely to find significant Granger causality. 
So we can write a statistically identical system to (1) as: As discussed below, one can also convert (1) into a growth rate model through the use of a vector error correction model, VECM. However, the comparison between models using the levels and logarithms of the variables is more complicated, since they are not nested. A related measurement issue is that one might think that there is endogeneity because GDP includes military expenditure as a component and one might also want to use the non-military component of GDP instead of GDP.
If a set of variables are integrated of order one, I(1), stationary after being differenced once, as seems common for economic variables, and there exist linear combinations of them which are I(0), stationary; they are said to cointegrate. If there is cointegration, there must be GC in at least one direction; some feedback which stops the I(1) variables diverging. In dealing with I(1) data, it is convenient to rewrite the VAR, equation (1), in vector error correction model, VECM, form
or for this specific case 
The US case
The issues discussed above will be illustrated on US data. Model (1), a second order bivariate VAR with trend, was estimated on US data for two samples. GNC is rejected at the 10% level. However, the evidence is rather marginal since GNC is only rejected at the 1% level in 6 cases.
Turning to cointegration, for the system using and it is difficult to interpret the cointegrating relationship it might be better to assume and treat both variables as trend stationary, but this is a matter of judgement. 2 r =
Size of the effects
Although it is common just to report the results of the test, as was done in table 1 above; knowing that there is GC is of little interest in itself without knowing the sign. The standard way to analyse the effect of a shock to one variable on another in a VAR is by calculating the impulse response functions, IRFs, which measure the effect of a shock at period on future values of the variables. IRFs are calculated from the moving average representation of the VAR: given by,
( ) ' /( ' ); 0,1, 2,... , rather than negative as it was over the shorter period. Since this correlation is not structural, one
would not expect it to be constant over time. Response of LY to LY Response of LY to LY Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Instantaneous causality
Granger ( θ The conditions required to reduce the underlying VAR to an ECM and to test for a long-run relationship, irrespective of whether the data are I(0) or I(1), are discussed in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) .
Expectations further complicate the issue, particularly if one variable is a policy instrument. An effective policy instrument will be GNC to the variable it controls, since the variable being controlled will follow its desired path as the policy instrument offsets the shocks. This is one (of many) possible explanation for the result of Tang 
Additional variables
It is common to test for GC using a bivariate VAR in military expenditure and another focus variable, such as output as above. But this is subject to the criticism that it must be misspecified. Other variables than output, such as the threat, determine military expenditure, and other variables than military expenditure, such as investment, determine output. There is then an issue of the information set used to judge the incremental predictability. The only other information than past used to predict There is a substantial literature on possible ways of reducing the dimensionality of VARs. One route is to apply Bayesian shrinkage to the parameters of a large VAR as in Banbura et al. (2010) . Another route is to approximate the possible omitted variables by a few factors estimated from a large data set, which are then used in a factor augmented VAR, FAVAR. Gupta et al. (2010) examine the effect of defence spending on US output using a FAVAR. They converted their data into growth rates to ensure stationarity, and while one can estimate cointegrating FAVARs, there is the problem that the factors tend to be based on economic variables, while the crucial omitted variables may be strategic. These estimates confirm that conclusions on GC can be very sensitive to the number of variables included in the VAR, as well as to lag length, treatment of deterministics, and assumptions about order of integration and cointegration. Given the large number of possible specifications and the danger of data-mining, searching for results in accord with one's beliefs; there is an issue about how results should be reported. We have been able to report the degree of specification sensitivity in much more detail than is usually possible in the literature.
Other countries
We now consider more countries, to see whether there is any internationally consistent pattern of GC. Table 3 gives tests for six countries (Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, US) for the period 1960-2006, using the four variable VAR with trend. The lag order is chosen by the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion, which chooses one lag for all countries except the US, where two lags are chosen. Above the countries were treated individually, but much of the recent work on military expenditures and GC has treated the multiple countries as a panel (e. g. Tang et al., 2009) . Testing for GC in panels raise a range of further econometric issues.
These include the specification of the appropriate null and alternative hypotheses and the choice between the large number of possible estimators for dynamic, heterogeneous panels with cross-section dependence and potentially non-stationary data. Some of these issues are discussed in Smith and Fuertes (2010) .
Conclusion
The nature of the interaction of military expenditure with the economy has been the subject of extensive investigation and tests for Granger non-causality, in the context of a VAR, have been a popular tool in this investigation. This paper has provided a critical review of the available techniques and illustrated the issues with data for the US and some other OECD countries. The tests were seen to be sensitive to: how many variables are included in the VAR, lag lengths, treatment of deterministic elements, the sample or observation window used, the treatment of integration and cointegration and the significance level used.
Statistical measures may not be informative about these choices in the sense that the likelihood function is relatively flat and it may not be obvious how to trade off the benefit of better fit and the cost of added uncertainty that results from estimating extra parameters. Since the parameters are not structural they may not be stable over different time periods or different countries, and this was the case with the empirical results here.
It is important to recognise that Granger causality test statistics are uninformative about the size or direction of the predicted effects and Granger causality measures incremental predictability not economic causality. To determine how Granger causality relates to economic causality requires an identified structural model, and different, observationally equivalent, just identifying assumptions may
give very different causal pictures. While identification is difficult, some orientation of the research effort to try to develop more structural models would seem to be potentially more fruitful than less theoretical statistical approaches. One obstacle to developing more structural models is providing measures of the political and strategic determinants of military expenditures, such as threats.
